[Dubs]

Pat of the difference between Greer’s calculation and the dominant opinion on this site is largely, I believe, due to focus. JMG seems more interested in the oil et al. side of the discussion, regardless of the interplay of energy and finance. TAE, of course, is more concerned with finance. One primary difference is that one is tangible, while the other isn’t, but for the impact it may have.

If left to market mechanisms alone, our descent would be drawn out as one energy source would be replaced by another with a slightly lower EROEI, and energy-intensive habits give way to more efficient/less costly ones. I think this will still provide the backdrop against which the contraction of over-extended credit will play out. Don’t forget, if cheap energy were actually unlimited, growing debt burdens would not be nearly as big of an issue. Financial turmoil will lead to some periods that are more difficult than others, of course, and likely cause more pain than otherwise, but the end game will depend first and foremost on energy and its accessibility. Who knows how much is left, but more than half a century’s worth seems like as reasonable a guess as any, which provides enough time to begin to adapt locally (for example rebuilding soil fertility).

What seems more important (i.e. unpredictable) than decline itself is how this will play out politically. When will food costs become unbearable? When will overly complex supply chains break down?

[Dubs]

Lucas,

JMG certainly is of the opinion that our descent will be a drawn out process, although he certainly avoids providing more specific impirical reasons. I would be interested in why Nicole thinks an implosion is more likely? Barring worldwide contagion in the financial system as Greece and more importantly Spain head towards default (is contagion a foregone conclusion?), a drawn out descent characterized by fits and starts seems most likely.

[Author]

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