The Velocity of the American Consumer
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DPC Times Square seen from Broadway 1908 I was reading something yesterday by my highly esteemed fellow writer Charles Hugh Smith that had me first pu
[See the full post at: The Velocity of the American Consumer]@Illargi,
I’m trying not to wrap this all in a blanket of Neoclassical economic thinking (mostly out of fear that Steve Keen might jump out from the shadows and whack me over the head with a copy of Debunking Economics!), but my mind drifts to the ‘totem’ of the Supply and Demand curve, where money velocity represents the Demand side of the equation (but only in terms of money being a medium of exchange).
Without giving it any deep thought, it would seem to me that the ‘price’ of money falls when Supply is increased (i.e. massive credit expansion or outright money printing), but also when the Demand for money as a medium of exchange falls (i.e. when money starts to be hoarded as a store of value).
Reversely, the ‘price’ of money seems to increase when Supply is decreased (i.e. debt defaults or outright destruction of money) or when the Demand for money as a medium of exchange increases (i.e. when goods and/or services becomes more desirable than holding onto money as a store of value).
If any of that makes any sense then I wonder what happens when the desire/confidence to spend more and thus increase the velocity of money occurs but the money supply is insufficient to compensate? It makes me think of a saying Nicole seems to be fond of – Demand isn’t what you want but what you can afford.
Back to Neoclassical economic thinking (*looks over his shoulder for Steve Keen*), it would seem what Charles is suggesting is true based on the accepted mathematical calculation for the Velocity of Money, Vt = nT/M, where Vt = the velocity of money for all transactions, nT = the nominal value for all transactions, and M = money supply.
By that I mean that nT could be staying constant (even though I’m sure you would be right in arguing that it is declining) while M is increasing, resulting in a lower velocity of money. In a purely Neoclassical economic / mathematical sense, Charles is correct that Fed policies (which have themselves increased or at least permitted the increase of the money supply) have effectively crashed the velocity of money.
It is true that velocity and supply are unrelated, but it is it true that consumers have *no* money? It’s probably more true to say they have a lot *less* “money” (cash+credit) than before, as they have no confidence and stopped borrowing. That’s exactly why prices have to drop. If they don’t drop to a point where the new consumer — i.e. he-who-hath-little-money — can buy them, then they don’t get bought. i.e. falling sales = falling exchange of money = velocity falls. But if prices were to drop enough — e.g. US houses fall from 6x income ($200k) to 1/6 income ($5k) then very probably even the new, poor worker would be able to buy one. Actually, that’s what happened in the 30’s Depression: in places property finally changed hands at –ZERO– value. You could own it if you could carry the taxes. Yet at that point property finally changed hands again, i.e. velocity normalized.
But a $5k property value would require the existing owner to take a $195k “loss.” (quotes because it may have been a paper gain in the first place. It is, however, someone’s potential collateral) To avoid that loss and instant bankruptcy, and as many are banks who hold mortgages as collateral, they arrange a variety of tricks to prevent any attempt at market clearing, (as have other monopolies, medical, cable, insurance…) Then prices don’t fall, property doesn’t sell, and money then doesn’t change hands. That is to say, velocity is crippled. At $5,000 houses and 50c steaks, I wager money and property would start changing hands again. Even at a median income of $30k, with 100M Americans not in workforce. Prices would fall in line with wages, because without debt, one or the other must converge.
The point is, at *some* price, everything will sell. So why are the sellers in charge of the prices? Why not the buyers? The sellers are stuck with the property and the carrying costs, without a buyer, their only option is to give it away for $0. So surely it’s the buyers who have the real power whether they are freely willing to buy or not? It’s buyers who make velocity and sellers who prevent it by holding out. So if you have an economy where all the political power is held by capital owners, i.e. the status quo, and little is held by the general public, i.e. workers and consumers, then the general public eventually goes on strike: they don’t buy anything. Capital owners demand them to buy, to buy healthcare or else, hand over their bank deposits with bail-ins, but as in Greece, that only makes them buy less out of protection and uncertainty. So we have one side forcing prices up politically, forcing sales to occur at gunpoint, and the other side hiding from them. The “hiding from them” part is velocity, as we see in Greece. I bet there’s a lot of money still in Greek cookie jars, a lot of capital tools in idle factories, a number of assets as collateral to borrow against, but everyone’s in hiding. As their capital is in hiding.
These “capital hiders/hoarders” are the buyers. Until the prices fall to where the buyers feel safe buying, there is no velocity. Ever. 70 years in the Soviet Union. 700 years in the middle ages. Until you can get a fair price, one buyers agree to, who know they have property rights after the purchase, you will have no velocity. Why would you take precious capital out of hiding to overpay for assets that can be stolen because there’s no rule of law? Ever? Even at gunpoint, in Kiev or Sarajevo, at swordpoint in Rome, they buried the coins and the hordes are still being dug up. Velocity will normalize when there is again a *fair* exchange of buyers and sellers, without violence, coercion or price-fixing. Until then, you no longer have markets and the economy will remain crippled, forever, until it is fixed.
As Ilargi says, you have a political problem, not a financial problem. Or put another way, you have a violence problem.
Variable,
I think the velocity graph says plenty to prove the Neoclassical theory wrong. Put it this way: there’s nothing that says velocity has any direct connection with supply. It can go up or down while supply goes the opposite direction.
Daiblo,
Yeah, Charles’ reader is not all wrong, there’s always a point at which ‘trade’ can start up again. Even if increasing amounts of people are locked out, there’ll be some who are not. But when homes can only trade at for example 1% of their building costs ($1000-$5000), we have a problem way beyond Houston. Detroit did it, though.. What I’m trying to say is that such a purely theoretical view is of little value out there. ‘There’s always some point ‘ means little if that point would bring down the entire economy.
I hate the word confidence in relation to economics. I’m not disputing IM when I say that it isn’t confidence with drives spending and velocity, it’s money. Confidence doesn’t drive spending, it is the other way around. Money in hand raises confidence.
One is falling into a trap when you bring “confidence” into the discussion. The very trap Economics has fallen into. Again I don’t want to argue with IM but I think it is more than just semantics to raise this point. “Confidence” is a red herring, as we say in the USA. It is a show me the money economy.The money is trapped in the financial economy. In the old days when bank loans were the largest source of credit by far then the credit cycle did first see financial asset prices turn up first as credit expanded but the real people economy soon followed. Now so much credit goes directly into financial and other assets, and stays there. It isn’t a ‘confidence’ economy it is a show me the money economy. Confidence is the result of more money, not the other way around.
On a deeper level it would be insane to want people in the rich developed world to want to spend more on stuff. We have enough stuff, poorly distributed to be sure. Evan at that however, and sadly borrowing a page from the reactionary right, even our poor are rich, by any historic standard. Economics isn’t going to save us.
I think the reason velocity is going down is because the money supply is growing disproportionately to transactions and gnp thanks to QE.
Think about it. There’s something like an extra 4 trillion dollars sit in bank reserves doing nothing thanks to the Fed. Take away that money supply and the velocity of money wouldn’t be crashing the way it is.
In other words I don’t think velocity of money crashing tells us much about the health or illness of the consumer.In fact just taking another glance at the graphs above, look at the correlation between money supply growth and the crash in velocity…sorry illargi but I think chs is right. The fed has crashed the velocity of money. It doesn’t matter though because there are many other stats that show that the American consumer by and large is massively suffering. Isn’t the middle class now a minority for the first time in decades.
I keep hearing this “94 million people not in the labor force” stat, and it got me to wondering: Is this remotely true? Here’s a good discussion:
https://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2013/jul/30/blog-posting/are-90-million-americans-not-working-or-looking-wo/
From the link, breaking down the numbers:• People age 16 to 17, who likely are in high school: 9 million
• People who are enrolled in either two- or four-year colleges: 21 million
• People age 65 and older, who have reached retirement age: 40 million people
That means 20 million people are of normal working age, not in college and not working. That’s less than one-quarter the amount repeatedly cited in the blogosphere.
So the 90 million number is exaggerated. Even so, the idea that fewer people are joining the workforce is something that worries economists.
Velocity is the term under discussion, but I’m not sure it captures individual or household economics, which are of course, different. In my work as a regional planner for 35 years, I used economic analysis as one tool in the development of recommended policies and programs for
People for whom money “burns a hole in their pocket”, like my son, would be the velocity folks, gunning the throttle until the tank is empty. My daughter, on the other hand, would save – be more tempered in her use. That isn’t necessarily a brake. If it went into a bank, when banks actually needed deposits, it would be available for others that wanted to rent it. Credit is treated as money – and it used to be that, when its source was the savings of others.
When credit extension creates money – the item value may be overstated (list price) and the interest adds to the profit. So a dollar down gets you a new car or whatever. Cash price that day might be $500, but with credit it might be $600 or more. Worth it in many circumstances, providing you have the income to pay off the principle and interest. The old rule of 78s gave the pre-payment penalty – extension of credit has costs. Vendor financing – GM, Sears, GE made finance the profit center.
All this was useful when people managed their debt – and had savings. No over extension in terms of ability to repay. In home buying, the house was not an investment, but where you lived. If paid off by retirement, then only taxes and maintenance had to be covered. Most U.S. housing stock since the 1950’s was built for single family ownership, not rental. S-F housing is high maintenance – yardwork required; not the best style for people who move. Renters, being deemed not as good as homeowners, in some cases you couldn’t be on the planning commission or on a jury if you were not a property owner, that housing stock was unwanted. The high unefficiency of the American housing stock is one reason it is so expensive. Banks wanted zoning since the 1930’s to protect housing value so longer term loans could be made. The separation of uses to enable this created the unwalkable distances of the now entirely automobile dependent society.
Somewhere in the 1980’s – 90’s, the economy shifted on debt from repay to re-fi(nance). The debt creating and recycling economy came into being. Costs rose faster than wages, so the difference was made up with credit. The more debt you had, the more you could get. As the finance fees, more than interest, was the income source, the more the better as far as the financial folks were concerned. Failure of individuals and households to be able to repay was fodder to raise interest rates beyond usury standards. That the vendors were being fraudulent in extending credit and should have had higher standards, well that wasn’t even a thought for those whose PRODUCT IS DEBT. (Apologies for shouting).
So, I believe it is one of the basic thoughts of Nicole and The Automatic Earth that there is more debt, more claim on assets, than there are assets in the physical world. The living assets, debt slaves yet unaware of their condtion, will produce for quite a long time. The balance sheet method of accounting, rather than cash, can easily be balanced by the insertion of an asset valuation equal to or larger than the debt.
Treading water is the velocity? Economies will shrink to the sustainable.
The financial situation of the 1980’s led me to make a case for regional cooperation in a World Future Society paper. Credit magic somehow changed the dynamics, but in doing so – we are worse off in an existential sense. A new message from God would be useful, at least in providing direction. Here’s the paper REGIONAL COUNCILS: Today’s Governmental Tool for the 21st Century (1986)
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