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  • in reply to: Boeing’s Problem Is Not Software #46474
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    Hi Raúl

    Very interesting post, I agree with you, this is not a software problem is a much more profound and far reaching causes to these disasters. Some of them:

    1) I think Boeing is accustomed to the “easy” profits of selling products to the Pentagon, easy wins from taxpayers, and did not develope new civil aircrafts as Airbus did

    2) Airbus marketed a new plane A320Neo in 2011 build to accomodate high efficiency (bigger) motors, Boeing did not have anything similar at that moment. We live in an era of cheap tickets and the fuel efficiency is king

    3) Boeing transform the 1960’s 737 quickly to accomodate the new high efficiency motors, to compete in this market without wait for a new design (+10 years), but the motors are in an “unnatural” elevated and forward position that makes de plane more prone tu up the nose

    4) To avoid the inherent aerodynamic instability with the new motors and at the same time to avoid costly training for the airlines (customers) they field the MCAS, using, at the same time, the same sensors of the “old” 737. After all the driverless systems is the future…

    5) The FAA follow, from 2005 onwards, a process of “self-regulation”, and then some employess of the companies made the safety assessments of their products, and all the certification process for the 737 Max was based on the principle of “sufficient similarity” (like the GMO). This employees, of course, are subject to pressure from Boeing to market the plane ASAP

    6) To justify the principle of “sufficient similatity” they do not change the systems of sensors, and the MCAS system use, in fact, only one sensor of the two. Also to avoid more “costly” training (only 30 min un an Ipad is enough) and time for certification (every change affect the process)

    7) As is the “same” 737, they (Boeing and FAA) considered it was not necessary to include all the charasteristics of the MCAS in the flight manual, because it is an “intelligent” system

    At the end you can see here how a plutocratic system pervert all the chain of safeguards that could prevent such disasters, starting from the FMEA and Hazop analysis, continuing with the “collabotative” regulator (FAA), the self-regulation regime, financialization of the chain of decisions, they know they are too big to fail, etc….

    It is not a technicall problem at all (like the case of VW and the dieselgate), it is a systemic one

    Cheers
    David

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